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Abstract 
Conflict can be defined as an interactive process involving incompatibility, disagreement, or 
difference within or between social entities (i.e. individuals, group, organizations). This may 
lead to stagnation and poor decisions, but on the other hand, it can foster creativity and 
problem-solving. To enable a better understanding of dynamics during conflict, we employed 
the prey-predator game to investigate decision behavior when people make investments on 
behalf of others (i.e. the principle-agent problem). Research on decision-making on behalf of 
others is crucial in minimizing the detrimental outcomes of conflict. We expected people to 
invest more aggressively in attack on behalf of others due to the possibility of altruistic 
rationalization, while this was not applicable when making decisions for oneself. Based on 
moral appeal of defending oneself against exploitation, we expected defense investments to 
be the same on behalf of self as on behalf of others. In contradiction to our hypotheses, results 
show a significant decline in both attack and defense in overall investment on behalf of other 
in comparison to decision on behalf of self. For explorative purposes, we investigated the 
frequency and forcefulness of investment on behalf of self and others for future research. This 
paper contributes to a better understanding of attack-defense dynamics on behalf of others, 
and thereby might enable better regulation of conflict.  
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Introduction 
Conflict can be described as ‘‘an interactive process within or between social 
entities—such as individuals, groups, or organizations—involving incompatibility, 
disagreement, or difference’’ (Rahim, 2011). Georg Simmel (1955) characterized conflict as 
‘one of the most vivid interactions’ among humans, originating from ‘dissociating’ factors 
such as ‘hate, envy, need, and desire’ (Hedström & Bearman, 2009). Although conflict often 
has a negative undertone, it can lead to both positive and negative outcomes. On the one hand, 
conflict may lead to stagnation in productivity and poor decisions. On the other hand, conflict 
fosters creativity, innovation and problem-solving (Rahim, 2011).  
 There are different types of conflict, which are characterized by their distinctive 
dynamics. Dynamics employed in attacker-defender conflicts are quite common, and often 
entail an attacker’s desire the improve the current situation (i.e. status quo) and a defender’s 
desire to maintain and protect this. This means the attacker-defender conflict is characterized 
by incompatible interests, where only one party (attacker or defender) can attain its preferred 
state. These conflicts arise, for example, when there is a disagreement over the possession of 
land. Here, one country tries to accumulate wealth in terms of territory (i.e. attack), while the 
other country tries to prevent this from happening and maintain possession over the land (i.e. 
defense). In the end, only one party (attacker versus defender) can possess the land, and 
thereby attain its preferred state (De Dreu & Gross, 2018).  
 Animals in conflict also generally demonstrate these attacker-defender dynamics 
(Boehm, 2009, 2012, Dawkins & Krebs, 1979, Sapolsky, 2017, Wrangham, 2018, retrieved 
from De Dreu & Gross, 2018). An example of animals employing these dynamics can be 
nicely illustrated by a lion chasing a gazelle. The lion (i.e. predator) tries to attack the gazelle 
(i.e. its prey) and accumulate food, while the gazelle tries to escape to prevent this from 
happening. While it is in the lion’s best interest to mismatch the strategy of the gazelle, it is in 
the gazelle’s best interest to match the strategy of the lion. Therefore, the lion tries to outrun 
the gazelle (i.e. mismatch), and the gazelle tries to be as fast as the lion (i.e. match). This 
means that attacker-defender games have their equilibrium in an asymmetric matching-
mismatching of strategies (De Dreu & Gross, 2018). 
For clarification of the attacker-defender game equilibrium, we used war as an 
example. As long as the defender party protects the land with equal force they will not be 
conquered and will protect themselves against exploitation. On the other hand, the attacker 
party will try to outperform and invest more than the defender party, to accumulate the land at 
the expense of the defender.  
To investigate the dynamics that occur when people make decisions as attacker or 
defender in conflict, De Dreu, Giacomantonio, Giffin, & Vecchiato (2018) employed the 
prey-predator contest (PPC) game (De Dreu et al., 2015, also see Carter & Anderton, 2001; 
Chowdhury et al., 2017; Grossman & Kim, 2002). The PPC game is a model that simulates 
the attack-defense conflict where participants are assigned to the role of attacker or defender. 
Participants make decisions to invest out of their given endowment of 10 Euros. Here, 
attackers make investments in predation to accumulate wealth at the expense of the defenders. 
Meanwhile, defenders make investments to protect themselves against exploitation. In the 
research by De Dreu et al. (2018) people had to make investments on behalf of themselves. 
Results showed that people make more aggressive investments in defense than attack. 
Thereby, defenders invested more frequently and if they did so, more forcefully than 
attackers.  
Less investment in attack than defense can be explained by the do-no-harm principle 
(Molenmaker, De Kwaadsteniet, & Van Dijk, 2016; Baron, 1993, 1995; Baron & Jurney, 
1993; Baron & Ritov, 1994; Ritov & Baron, 1990; Spranca, Minsk, & Baron, 1991; see also 
Van Beest, Van Dijk, De Dreu, & Wilke, 2005). This principle entails the social norm that it 
is wrong to harm some people in order to help others, even when the benefits outweigh the 
harm (Baron, 1995). Therefore, people are reluctant to harm (i.e. attack) others. On the 
contrary, when the social norm to not behave aggressively towards each other breaks down, 
people are morally entitled to aggressively defend themselves (Rodin, 2004). In other words, 
protecting oneself against predation is more justifiable than inflicting harm on others (i.e. 
attacking). For example, when an invasion occurs defenders are morally entitled to 
aggressively defend their territory. This can also be illustrated by the lion-gazelle example, 
where the gazelle tries to stay alive and the lion is just chasing for another meal. This 
indicates that defending oneself against predation seems the moral behavior to display. 
Apart from making decisions on behalf of oneself, people often make decisions on 
behalf of others. Making decisions on behalf of others resembles the principle-agent problem. 
Here, the individual in control (i.e. agent) decides on behalf of the other individuals (i.e. 
principle) (Myerson, 1982). Examples of the principle-agent problem include a commander 
giving orders in a military operation, a firm owner who delegates the running of the firm to a 
manager (Grossman & Hart, 1983), and advisors making financial decisions on behalf of 
others (Myerson, 1982). This means that people exert control over extremely important 
choices about the lives of others. However, thus far little research has been done in attacker-
defender conflict, and therefore it remains unknown which dynamics take place when people 
make attack versus defense decisions on behalf of others.  
Concluding, the dynamics of the attack-defense conflict are already seen before 
humans existed and therefore deeply rooted in our primitive patterns of behaviour. 
Unfortunately, these dynamics are thus far poorly understood. By looking at investments in 
attack or defense, we will attempt to achieve a better understanding of these dynamics. We 
will investigate the dynamics when people make decisions on behalf of themselves, and on 
behalf of others to extend our knowledge. It is important to look into the principle-agent 
problem because people exert control over important decisions of others. As mentioned 
earlier, conflict can be detrimental and beneficial. By better understanding the dynamics of 
principle-agent interactions, pitfalls might be identified when individuals make decisions on 
behalf of others. In this way, harmful decisions might be recognized at an early stage which 
could enable better regulation of conflict. Regulation, by the means of applicable rules, might 
minimize the wastefulness and foster the benefits of conflict. Hereby, better functioning of 
society will be established. To address this goal, we will use the prey-predator contest (PPC) 
game (De Dreu & Gross, 2018).  
When people make decisions on behalf of others, the interaction switches from 
interindividual (i.e. deciding on behalf of oneself) to intergroup interaction (i.e. deciding on 
behalf of others). We will investigate the discontinuity effect, which states that intergroup 
interactions are more competitive and less cooperative than interindividual interactions 
(Schopler & Insko, 1992), in the PPC game. Gustav Le Bon (1895), a French social 
psychologist, clearly describes the discontinuity effect as: “Isolated, he may be a cultivated 
individual; in a crowd he is a barbarian, that is, a creature acting by instinct” (Le Bon, 2002).  
It has been proposed that the social support of greed hypothesis is an antecedent of the 
discontinuity effect (Wildschut, Insko, & Gaertner, 2002). The social support for greed 
hypothesis entails that greedy behavior, which refers to a concern for maximizing one’s own 
outcomes, relative to the outcomes of the other side (Schopler & Insko, 1992), may be more 
easily adopted when people decide on behalf of others because they can rationalize harmful 
(i.e. aggressive) decisions as being altruistic to their own group (McCallum et al., 1985; 
Insko, Pinkley, Hoyle, et al., 1987, retrieved from Schopler et al., 1993). Therefore, when 
people make decisions on behalf of others, social support can be provided to pursue their own 
interests in a competitive manner (Wildschut, Insko, & Gaertner, 2002). Altruistic 
rationalization of aggressive decisions, is in contradiction to deciding on behalf of others, not 
applicable to deciding on behalf of oneself (Wildschut, Insko, & Gaertner, 2002).  
Deciding on behalf of others entails shared responsibility, while deciding on behalf of 
oneself entails personal responsibility. Thus, when deciding on behalf of others, people may 
have a diminished feeling of being responsible since the opportunity to share this with others. 
Because individuals in groups are less restrained by the sense of personal responsibility (i.e. 
diffusion of responsibility), they feel less restrained to harm on behalf of others. Therefore, 
the agent (i.e. decision maker) has the possibility to justify decisions as benefitting, for 
example, his or her principal (i.e. boss). On the contrary, when people inflict harm on behalf 
of themselves they are personally responsible for this and hold themselves internally 
accountable (Molenmaker, de Kwaadsteniet, & van Dijk, 2016). 
Based on the above, the following predictions can be made. Following the social 
support for greed hypothesis, we expect more aggressive investments when people decide on 
behalf of others in comparison to when people decide on behalf of oneself (within attacker 
comparison in Block 1 versus Block 2). Following the moral viewpoint of defending, we do 
not expect defend investments to differ on behalf of oneself compared to defend investments 
on behalf of others (within defender comparison in Block 1 versus Block 2). Accordingly, we 
predict a Role x Block interaction, such that Block has a stronger effect on attackers than it 
has on defenders (interaction effect).  
Thereby, we replicated the study of De Dreu et al. (2018). Based on the do-no-harm 
principle, we expect attack investments people make on behalf of themselves to be lower than 
defend investments (main effect for Role across both blocks).   
 
Method and Materials 
Participants and Design  
We recruited 114 participants (males and females combined) in order to achieve good 
statistical power. The participants were randomly assigned to dyads, and within dyads to 
either the role of attacker (N = 57) or defender (N = 57). They made decisions in three 
different blocks, with Block 1 and 2 relevant for the current study. Therefore, Block 3 is 
further ignored. In Block 1 all participants made 30 decisions, either as attacker or as 
defender, on behalf of themselves. In Block 2, they made 30 decisions, either as attacker or as 
defender, on behalf of someone else in the same role (i.e. their principle, also in either the 
attacker or defender role). This means participants have the same role (attacker or defender) 
for 60 decisions in total.  
The study was fully incentivized, did not involve deception, and was approved by the 
Psychology Ethics Board of Leiden University. Participants gave written informed consent 
and were debriefed.  
Procedure 
Participants were recruited at the University of Leiden. An experimental session took 
approximately 1 hour. Supplementary to the standard hour rate of 6.50 or 2 credits, 
participants received additional earnings from the PPC game. 
When the subjects arrived at the lab they were kindly requested to quietly wait for the 
other participants. When the experiment started a deck of cards, which referred to the 
assigned cubicle number, were shuffled and randomly divided among the subjects. Hereafter, 
subjects were escorted to their cubicle number. Subjects were seated in an individual cubicle 
with a computer and keyboard and received online instructions for the PPC game (see 
Appendix).  
Subjects received information of their assignment to the attacker or defender role, 
which was the same in Block 1 and 2. Half of the subjects made decisions in the role of 
attacker and were paired with a subject in the role of defender. When someone is an attacker 
in Block 1, the same holds for Block 2. Subjects had to make 30 decisions on behalf of 
themselves (Block 1) and 30 decisions on behalf of someone else (Block 2). Participants thus 
play one role (i.e. attacker or defender) acting for self in Block 1 and for another participant 
(i.e. their principle) in Block 2. The assigned partner (attacker or defender) is the same in 
Block 1 and 2. In Block 2, there were new “principals” added to each attacker and each 
defender, but these principals were otherwise passive (except in Block 3, which is further 
ignored in this study).  
To ensure that participants understood the game, a comprehension check was 
implemented. When this check was successfully completed participants could continue to 
start the real experiment. Occasionally, instructions were explained by the researchers 
because participants had trouble answering the comprehension check questions. Participants 
possibly had to wait to start making real investments until their opponent also had completed 
the check.  
On each trial in Block 1 and 2, subjects decided how much to invest (out of €10 Euros 
endowment) by clicking on numbers between 0 and 10 displayed on the computer screen. 
After each trial, the subjects were shown how much the other person for that trial had 
invested, and their earnings for that trial. If the attacker invested more than its defender, the 
attack earned what the defender had not invested and this was added to the attacker’s own 
left-over; if the attacker invested equal or less than its defender, both attacker and defender 
earned the left-over (De Dreu et al., 2018). Therefore, earnings on each trial are determined 
by the combination of both players’ choices. This means participants are in an interdependent 
relationship. 
 
Analysis and Results 
To investigate our hypothesis, we used a 2 (Role: attacker or defender; within-dyads) x 
2 (Block: on behalf of self or other; within subjects) analysis of variance (ANOVA). A within 
subjects is chosen because this design is a powerful way of reducing variability produced by 
individual differences (Mook, 2001).  
From the 30 trials in each block (i.e. Block 1 and 2) we derived the average overall 
investment (range 0 – 10). Our predictions are pertaining to the overall investment.  
However, we also investigated the investment frequency (number of trials on which an 
investment was made; range 0 – 30) and the average forcefulness (investments on trials were 
investments were made; rage 1-10) for exploratory purposes. By investigating investments to 
a greater extent, more specific hypotheses may be tested in future research. Table 1 displays 
the mean and standard deviation of the overall investments, investment frequency and average 
forcefulness pertaining defenders and attackers in Block 1 and Block 2.  
Overall investment 
First, we analysed the interaction (Role*Block) and main effects (Role and Block) on 
overall investment. We expected an interaction due to the possibility of altruistic 
rationalization for aggressive attack investments, while this was not applicable for defense. 
However, the interaction of Role and Block was not statistically significant (p = .647). No 
interaction effect indicates that the effect of Block on the overall investment is the same for 
attackers and defenders. Figure 1A shows that defense and attack investments both decrease 
on behalf of others in comparison to on behalf of self. Results showed a significant effect of 
Block on overall investment (p = .013). This indicates that the overall investment is 
significantly lower in Block 2 compared to Block 1 pertaining to both attackers and 
defenders. 
Furthermore, we  expected attack investments people make on behalf of themselves to 
be lower than defend investments. Therefore, we investigated the effect of Role on overall 
investment. Results showed a significant (p < .001) effect of the factor Role, thus indicating 
that the overall investment is not equal for defenders and attackers across the average 
investment across Block 1 and Block 2. As seen in Figure 1A, investments of attackers are 
lower than investments of defenders. This means the do-no-harm hypothesis can be accepted.  
As displayed in Table 2, the factor Role explains 44.9% of the variation in the data, 
and that the factor Block explains 10.5% of the variation in the data. Therefore, the influence 
of Role is considerably larger than the influence of Block on overall investment.  
 
Figure 1. Overall investments (A), the frequency (B), and the force (C) of investments on 
behalf of others decrease for both attackers and defenders.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Frequency 
Secondly, we analysed the interaction (Role*Block) and the main effects (Role and 
Block) on the frequency of investment. We did not have any predictions for this. By 
investigating investments to a greater extent, more specific hypotheses may be tested in future 
research. Results showed no interaction effect (p = .995) between Role and Block. This 
indicates that the effect of Block on the frequency of investments is the same for attackers and 
defenders. Figure 1B shows that the frequency of attack and defense investments both 
decrease on behalf of others in comparison to on behalf of self. Hereafter, we investigated the 
main effect of Block. This shows a significant (p = .025) effect of Block, which indicates that 
the frequency of investment is significantly lower in Block 2 compared to Block 1 pertaining 
to both defenders and attackers. The effect of Role was also significant (p < .001), indicating 
that the frequency of investment is not equal for defenders and attackers across Block 1 and 
Block 2. As seen in Figure 1B, the frequency of investments is significantly lower in attackers 
compared to defenders.  
 
 
Forcefulness 
Thirdly, we analysed the interaction (Role*Block) and the main effects (Role and 
Block) on the forcefulness of investments. Results showed no interaction effect of 
Role*Block (p = .979). This indicates that the effect of Block on the forcefulness of 
investments is the same for attackers and defenders. Figure 1C shows that the forcefulness of 
attack and defense investments both decrease on behalf of others in comparison to on behalf 
of self. Hereafter, we investigated the main effects. We found a significant (p < .001) effect of 
Block, which indicates that the forcefulness of investment is significantly different between 
Blocks pertaining to both defenders and attackers. As seen in Figure 1C, the forcefulness of 
investments is significantly lower in Block 2 compared to Block 1. The effect of Role was 
also significant (p < .001), which indicates that the forcefulness of investment is not equal for 
defenders and attackers across Block 1 and Block 2. As seen in figure 1C, the forcefulness of 
investments is significantly lower in attackers compared to defenders.  
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Attack and Defend Investments in Both Blocks 
  Criterion   
 Overall Investment Frequency  Force   
 M (SD) M (SD) M (SD)  
Defender Block 1 5.13 (0.28)  27.11 (6.11)   4.63 (1.87)  
Defender Block 2 4.85 (0.30) 26.00 (8.26) 4.20 (1.97)  
Attacker Block 1 4.50 (0.32) 24.28 (8,47) 3.64 (1.93)  
Attacker Block 2 4.15 (0.31)  23.19 (9.37) 3.21 (1.80)  
 
 
Table 2. Overview results of Attack and Defend Investments in Both Blocks 
 
 
 
 
 
   Overall investment Frequeny Force 
   F ηp² F ηp² F ηp² 
Predictors         
Role   45.697*** 0.449 11.415*** 0.169 152.258*** 0.731 
Block   6.602** 0.105 2.320* 0.040 18.299*** 0.246 
Role*Block   0.212 0.004 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 
* p < .05.  ** p < .025  *** p < .01     
Discussion 
 Research on attack-defense conflicts mainly focused on decisions on behalf of 
oneself.. However, the deeply rooted attack-defense dynamics when deciding on behalf of 
others (i.e. principle-agent problem) are thus far poorly understood. This is relevant to study 
because people make extremely important decisions on behalf of others. Examples range from 
a commander giving orders in a military operation to making financial investments on behalf 
of others.  Therefore, This study contributed to existing research by investigating the 
dynamics of deciding on behalf of others in the PPC game. 
In contradiction with our predictions, results showed there was no interaction effect 
between Role (attacker versus defender) and Round (block 1 versus block 2), and that both 
defenders and attackers invest significantly less aggressively on behalf of others than on 
behalf of self.  
Therefore, social support for greed hypothesis, which entails that people attack more 
aggressively on behalf of others (within attacker comparison in Block 1 versus Block 2), can 
be rejected. Following the moral appeal hypothesis we did not expect defend investments to 
differ on behalf of self compared to defend investments on behalf of others (within defender 
comparison in Block 1 versus Block 2). Nevertheless, we cannot conclude that the moral 
appeal hypothesis should be rejected. This is because earnings depend on both the investment 
of the attacker and defender (i.e. interdependent relationship). Therefore, the defender may 
adapt to their counterparts’ investment to survive, and invest higher as a reaction to the 
attackers’ investment. If attackers become more aggressive it is more beneficial for the 
defenders to higher their investments to survive. Thus, the moral appeal hypothesis may be 
true, but its impact is weaker than the mere fact that defenders (also) have to respond to their 
attacker’s aggressiveness. Concluding, survival may be a more powerful and deeply rooted 
urge than moral appeal. 
Furthermore, results showed that people invest more in defense than attack when 
making decisions on behalf of oneself. This is in line with the research by De Dreu et al. 
(2018). Therefore, we can accept the do-no-harm hypothesis. This effect can, apart from the 
do-no-harm principle, also be explained by the principle of loss-aversion. This is the general 
finding that losses are weighted disproportionately to gains of the same amount (Gilhooly, 
Lyddy, & Pollick, 2009). Following this principle, one can expect defense investments to be 
more aggressive than attack investments. 
 Furthermore, we found a limitation of our study design. The disadvantage of a within 
subjects design is that a carry-over effect might have occurred. Participants had to make 
decisions in Block 1 and Block 2 either as attacker or defender. When, for example, there is a 
relatively consistent pattern in the counterparts’ investments, participants could learn which 
strategy is the most beneficial to adopt to maximize their own outcomes. For example, it 
could be the case that an attacker competing with a relatively aggressive defender decides to 
invest less over rounds in Block 1 to maximize their earnings. By learning that relatively low 
investments was the most beneficial choice, participants may be inclined to continue to do 
this in Block 2 even though they are not making decisions on behalf of themselves anymore, 
but on behalf of others. To prevent this effect, future research should focus on making 
decisions on behalf of oneself and on behalf of others separately. If this is inconvenient, 
counterbalancing is recommended to distribute the possible carry-over effect equally over the 
conditions (Mook, 2001).   
 People could argue that using students as participants creates problems for causal 
inferences. Sear’s (1986) claims students to be a “narrow data base”. However, the theories 
we investigated; do-no-harm principle, social support for greed, and moral appeal are silent 
on the actors to whom they are designed to apply. Therefore, when we investigate this and 
look deeper into the attack-defense dynamics, this does not pertain to a specific group of 
people. This means that the use of students as participants is not problematic for the external 
validity of our study. 
 
Conclusion 
The current study showed a significant decline in overall investment for both 
defenders and attackers on behalf of others. Furthermore, our explanatory research showed a 
significant decline in the frequency and force of investment on behalf of others. Thereby, we 
found that the overall investment is significantly lower in attack than defense, which is in line 
with the do-no-harm hypothesis.  
This research contributes to a better understanding of attack-defense dynamics on 
behalf of others. In addition, our explanatory research about the frequency and forcefulness of 
investments on behalf of others may be useful for the formulation of future hypotheses. We 
hope that our research, by the use of applicable rules, enables minimization of the detrimental 
outcomes of conflict.  
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